The Whole Truth with David Eisenhower

NARRATOR: THE 1980s PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF RONALD REAGAN BURNED INTO THE AMERICAN CONSCIOUSNESS AN IMAGE OF OUR COUNTRY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA, THE IMAGE OF THE NEED FOR STRENGTH AND VIGILANCE AGAINST A SCARY BEAR IN THE WOODS.

WITH THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, MANY THOUGHT THE BEAR WAS GONE, BUT SINCE THE RISE TO POWER OF VLADIMIR PUTIN, CONCERN ABOUT THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD FROM RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA TO HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE TO CYBERATTACKS ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES HAS RETURNED IN MANY QUARTERS.

IS THE BEAR BACK IN THE WOODS, AND, IF SO, WHAT IS TO BE DONE ABOUT IT?

ANNOUNCER: THIS EPISODE OF "THE WHOLE TRUTH" WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY...

THE MILL SPRING FOUNDATION, THE DORAN FAMILY FOUNDATION, AMETEK, AND BY... FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING COURTROOMS AROUND THE WORLD, PEOPLE HAVE SWORN AN OATH TO TELL NOT ONLY THE TRUTH, BUT RATHER THE WHOLE TRUTH.

THE OATH REFLECTS THE WISDOM THAT FAILING TO TELL ALL OF A STORY CAN BE AS EFFECTIVE AS LYING IF YOUR GOAL IS TO MAKE THE FACTS SUPPORT YOUR POINT OF VIEW.

IN THE COURTROOM, THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH ALSO RELIES ON ADVOCATES ADVANCING FIRM CONTRADICTORY ARGUMENTS AND DOING SO WITH DECORUM.

ALL OF THESE APPLY TO THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION, WHAT JOHN STUART MILL CALLED "THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS."

THIS SERIES IS A PLACE IN WHICH THE COMPETING VOICES ON THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES OF OUR TIME ARE CHALLENGED AND SET INTO MEANINGFUL CONTEXT SO THAT VIEWERS LIKE YOU CAN DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES THE WHOLE TRUTH.

ON THIS EPISODE OF "THE WHOLE TRUTH," WE TAKE A DEEP DIVE ON THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA, ITS HISTORICAL EBBS AND FLOWS, ITS PRESENT UNCERTAIN TERRAIN, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ITS FUTURE DIRECTION.

AS ONE OF OUR GUESTS ON THIS EPISODE, THE NOTED HISTORIAN STEPHEN KOTKIN, HAS WRITTEN: "FOR HALF A MILLENNIUM, "RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED "BY SOARING AMBITIONS THAT HAVE EXCEEDED "THE COUNTRY'S CAPABILITIES.

"BEGINNING WITH THE REIGN OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE "IN THE 16th CENTURY, RUSSIA MANAGED TO EXPAND "AT THE AVERAGE RATE OF 50 SQUARE MILES PER DAY "FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS, EVENTUALLY COVERING ONE-SIXTH OF THE EARTH'S LANDMASS."

BUT DESPITE THAT VAST SIZE AND THE NATIONALISTIC MARTIAL SPIRIT AND SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PROWESS WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT EXPANSION OF TERRITORY, RUSSIA HAS ALWAYS BEEN RELATIVELY BACKWARD ECONOMICALLY COMPARED TO THE WEST IN GENERAL AND TO THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR.

TODAY RUSSIA HAS WEALTH ONLY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF PORTUGAL, A MODEST SIZED ECONOMIC POWER.

BUT, OF COURSE, RUSSIA ALSO HAS THE MOST NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD AND IS RULED BY SOMEONE WHO UNDENIABLY RANKS AMONG THE WORLD'S MOST CUNNING AND DARING PRACTITIONERS OF GEOPOLITICS, VLADIMIR PUTIN.

SO WHAT DOES PUTIN WANT?

AND DEPENDING ON HOW ONE ANSWERS THAT QUESTION, WHAT ARE THE ANCHORS OF NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA TODAY AND TOMORROW?

JOINING US HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES ARE STEPHEN KOTKIN, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROFESSOR AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY; ALINA POLYAKOVA, A RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT AND FELLOW AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; AND AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL AND U.S.

AMBASSADOR TO NATO AND FORMER U.S.

AMBASSADOR TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

WELCOME TO YOU ALL.

STEPHEN, I'D LIKE TO START WITH YOU AND ASK YOU TO SUMMARIZE THE THESIS OF YOUR ESSAY IN "FOREIGN AFFAIRS" ON RUSSIA'S PERPETUAL GEOPOLITICS, YOUR NOTION THAT PUTIN MARKS A RETURN TO A RUSSIAN HISTORICAL PATTERN.

I GUESS THE FIRST QUESTION IS, WHAT DOES HE REPRESENT, AND, SECOND, WHETHER THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH AN HISTORICAL PATTERN IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS AND GEOPOLITICAL/ GEOSTRATEGIC THINKING?

WE HAD THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, A MOVE TOWARDS WHAT LOOKED LIKE DEMOCRACY IN 1991, AND IT DIDN'T WORK.

AND THE DEBATE THAT WE'RE HAVING IN THE U.S. HAS TWO SIDES, MORE OR LESS.

ONE SIDE BELIEVES THAT IT WAS THE IMPOSITION OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMICS, THE FAILURE TO AFFORD RUSSIA A MARSHALL PLAN, SO PUSHING THEM TOO HARD, TOO QUICKLY INTO PRIVATIZATION AND MARKETS AND NOT GIVING THEM THE MARSHALL PLAN.

THAT'S THE REASON THAT IT DIDN'T TURN OUT TO BE A SUSTAINED CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEBATE MORE OR LESS COMES DOWN ON, "WELL, IT'S PUTIN'S PERSONALITY."

HERE YOU HAVE A FIGURE FROM THE KGB WHO'S REVANCHIST, AND ONE COULD THEN SPIN OUT THE KIND OF HOLLYWOOD-STYLE VILLAIN STORY THAT WE GET WITH PUTIN'S PERSONALITY.

SO WHERE I COME IN INSIDE THIS DEBATE IS TO SUGGEST THAT IT WASN'T THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT CAUSED THIS.

THAT IS TO SAY, IMPOSITION OF NEOLIBERALISM BY WASHINGTON OR THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

AND IT WASN'T SOLELY OR PREDOMINANTLY A MATTER MERELY OF PERSONALITY BECAUSE WHAT WE RECOGNIZE HERE IS A LONGER TERM PATTERN.

THERE ARE 4 QUICK DIMENSIONS TO THE LONGER TERM PATTERN.

THE FIRST IS THE DEEP DESIRE IN RUSSIAN NATIONAL CULTURE AND POLITICS TO BE WHAT THEY CALL A PROVIDENTIAL POWER, A POWER UNDER GOD-- A SPECIAL COUNTRY WITH A SPECIAL MISSION IN THE WORLD, MAYBE EVEN THE MOST SPECIAL COUNTRY.

THE SECOND DIMENSION IS THE GAP BETWEEN THIS ASPIRATION AND THEIR CAPACITIES.

THEY REALLY HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO LIVE UP TO THIS IMAGE THAT THEY WANT TO HAVE OF THEMSELVES.

AND SO THIS LEADS TO THE THIRD PIECE OF IT, WHICH IS RECOURSE TO THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO TRY TO CLOSE THE GAP WITH THE MORE POWERFUL COUNTRIES LIKE THE WEST, OR IF NOT CLOSE THE GAP, AT LEAST TO MANAGE THE GAP.

AND THEN YOU GET THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF MY STORY, WHICH IS THAT THE RECOURSE TO THE STATE, THE USE OF THE STATE, LEADS NOT TO BRINGING THE COUNTRY UP TO THE STANDARDS, UP TO ITS ASPIRATIONS-- THE STANDARDS OF THE WEST IN TERMS OF POWER AND MIGHT-- BUT INSTEAD LEADS TO A REGIME OF PERSONAL RULE, UNDER THE CZARS--PETER THE GREAT AND OTHERS; THERE WAS A VERSION UNDER COMMUNISM--STALIN; AND THERE'S A VERSION NOW UNDER PUTIN.

SO THAT DOESN'T TELL YOU HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND IN THE UNITED STATES TO THIS HISTORICAL PATTERN.

BUT, NONETHELESS, THAT'S HOW I SEE ITS DEVELOPMENT.

WELL, ALINA, I THINK THIS SEGUES TO YOU.

AND ONE--WOULD YOU AGREE OR CONCUR THAT THIS IS AN HISTORICAL PATTERN REEMERGING--NUMBER ONE?

AND NUMBER TWO-- CAN THE UNITED STATES RELY ON THAT?

IN OTHER WORDS, AS WE FORMULATE AN APPROACH TOWARDS RUSSIA, FORMULATE OUR OWN INTERESTS AND APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, IF THERE IS A PROBLEM, CAN WE RELY ON THIS PATTERN?

THE IDEA OF, I THINK, NEOLIBERAL REFORM IN RUSSIA WAS THAT WE COULD SOMEHOW BREAK THAT PATTERN.

WELL, I DO AGREE WITH STEVE THAT IF WE LOOK AT THE LONG HISTORICAL VIEW-- I MEAN, CERTAINLY, THERE IS SORT OF A CYCLICAL PATTERN TO RUSSIA IN THE VARIOUS FORMS IT HAS TAKEN BEFOREHAND IN THE FORM OF EMPIRE AND THE FORM OF THE SOVIET UNION, I THINK AS STEVE WAS DESCRIBING.

I THINK THE KEY POINT HERE IS THIS NOTION OF STATISM, WHICH, ON THE ONE HAND, HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE TOOL USED BY VARIOUS RUSSIAN LEADERS OR IMPERIAL LEADERS, SOVIET LEADERS TO TRY TO REASSERT RUSSIA'S PERCEIVED GREATNESS IN THE WORLD.

THAT HAS HAD VARIOUS SUCCESSES AND VARIOUS FAILURES.

I THINK THIS VALUE OF STATISM ABOVE THE INDIVIDUAL IS ALSO WHAT PUTS RUSSIA IN A VALUE CONFLICT WITH THE WEST.

AND WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IS, OF COURSE, IF WE THINK ABOUT AMERICAN "VALUES," IDEOLOGY, MOST WOULD AGREE THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALS ARE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND THE WESTERN VISION OF ITSELF AND WHAT IT SEEKS TO, THEN, AFFECT IN THE WORLD AROUND IT.

SO HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, POLITICAL RIGHTS.

SO THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL.

AND THAT LEADS TO-- THAT BECOMES REFLECTED IN CERTAIN FOREIGN POLICIES AS WELL.

AGAIN, I THINK AS STEVE WAS SAYING, THIS NOTION OF THIS ORDAINED LEADER WHO WILL MAKE RUSSIA GREAT AGAIN, IF YOU WILL, IS SOMETHING THAT PUTIN VERY MUCH SUBSCRIBES TO, IT SEEMS, JUST LOOKING AT WHAT HE'S BEEN DOING ON THE WORLD STAGE.

EISENHOWER: MR.

AMBASSADOR, THAT BRINGS US, I THINK, TO A QUESTION OF EVALUATING RUSSIAN CONDUCT TODAY.

WHAT KIND OF OPERATIVE LABEL WOULD YOU PLACE ON IT?

DEFENSIVE?

OFFENSIVE?

YEAH.

WELL, FIRST I'D SAY THAT WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN CYCLES THAT HAVE REPEATED THEMSELVES THROUGH HISTORY, I DON'T THINK RUSSIA'S DOOMED TO REPEAT ITS PAST.

AND WE DID SEE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTIES AN EFFORT BY RUSSIA TO CHOOSE A DIFFERENT PAST, TO BREAK AWAY FROM ITS HISTORICAL PATTERN.

IT MAYBE WAS TOO DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM.

THERE WAS NO ROAD MAP TO GET FROM THIS HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AND INEFFICIENT STATE TO A CAPITALIST SYSTEM WITHOUT CORRUPTION.

BUT, HOPEFULLY, AFTER PUTIN DEPARTS THE SCENE, WHICH MAY NOT BE ANYTIME SOON, THEY CAN GET ON THAT PATH AGAIN.

BUT TODAY'S RUSSIA, I THINK, HAS MIXTURES OF DEFENSIVENESS AND AGGRESSIVENESS.

PUTIN USES THE IDEA OF RUSSIA AS ENCIRCLED BY ENEMIES AS THE BESIEGED FORTRESS, BUT I THINK THAT THIS IS SOMETHING OF A PROPAGANDA LINE THAT HE USES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL AT HOME TO JUSTIFY THE PRIVATIONS THAT HAVE COME FROM THE SANCTIONS OVER UKRAINE.

I THINK THAT PEOPLE SAY IT'S ALL ABOUT NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA FEELING THREATENED BY NATO FORCES ON ITS DOORSTEP, BUT IT'S WORTH REMEMBERING THAT IN THE NINETIES, WE TOOK TREMENDOUS PAINS TO MAKE RUSSIA A STRATEGIC PARTNER, TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NATO EXPANSION WAS A POLITICAL PROJECT.

THERE WERE NO FORCES DEPLOYED TO THE EAST.

AND EVEN AFTER THE BALTIC STATES GOT INTO NATO, RUSSIA CONTINUED TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN THE WEST.

SO I THINK SOME OF THIS TALK OF ENCIRCLEMENT IS A BIT OF EX POST FACTO RATIONALIZATION.

WHAT PUTIN REALLY IS AFRAID OF IS NOT WESTERN MILITARY THREATS OR NATO EXPANSION, IT'S WESTERN IDEAS.

YOU WERE GOING TO SAY SOMETHING, ALINA.

YES?

WELL, I MEAN, JUST TO VERY QUICKLY FOLLOW UP ON SANDY'S VIEW OF POST-COLD WAR HISTORY, YOU KNOW, WE SHOULDN'T PUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS, TO GO BACK TO WHAT STEVE WAS SAYING, I THINK, ON THIS KIND OF DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THAT RUSSIA'S GOING TO REPEAT ITS OLD PATTERNS AND THERE'S NOT MUCH THAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT.

I THINK, CERTAINLY, LOOKING BACK AT THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD, SO EVEN STARTING IN THE SEVENTIES AND THE EIGHTIES, WHAT MOST PEOPLE DON'T REALIZE, THAT WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS WHERE I'M FROM, THERE WAS WIDESPREAD CYNICISM ABOUT THE SYSTEM AND A WIDESPREAD DESIRE FOR AMERICAN POP CULTURE BUT ALSO AMERICAN VALUES...

YES.

THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT.

SO I THINK SANDY'S COMPLETELY RIGHT THAT IT IS THIS FEAR OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN RUSSIA GIVEN WHAT'S HAPPENED IN PLACES LIKE UKRAINE, WHICH THE RUSSIANS IN THEIR IMAGINATION SEE AS VERY SIMILAR TO RUSSIA.

EISENHOWER: MR.

AMBASSADOR, YOU KNOW, THE SUGGESTION-- PUTIN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR WAS THE GREAT TRAGEDY OF THE 20th CENTURY, WHICH IS FASCINATING, IT RAISES THIS QUESTION OF PUTIN IS DIFFERENT.

MM-HMM.

BUT HOW SIMILAR IS HE?

HOW DIFFERENT IS HE?

HOW POWERFUL IS THIS NOSTALGIA, WOULD YOU SAY?

HOW IMPORTANT WOULD IT BE TO HIS PERSONAL RULE?

WELL, HE'S CERTAINLY DIFFERENT FROM GORBACHEV AND FROM YELTSIN.

AND HE CLEARLY SAW-- I MEAN, HE'S SINCERE WHEN HE SAYS THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE GREATEST TRAGEDY OF THE 20th CENTURY, CERTAINLY FOR HIM.

HE KIND OF MISSED THE WHOLE GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA PERIOD.

HE WAS OUT IN THE BOONDOCKS IN EAST GERMANY TOWARDS THE END OF HIS TENURE JUST BURNING THE CLASSIFIED FILES ON ALL THE AGENTS THAT THEY WERE RUNNING OUT THERE.

BUT HE MISSED KIND OF THE SPIRIT THAT GORBACHEV UNLEASHED.

AND I THINK WHAT STRUCK ME ABOUT GORBACHEV-- AND I WAS DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AFFAIRS IN THE LATE EIGHTIES AND UP UNTIL '91, RIGHT UP UNTIL THE DAY OF THE COUP, ACTUALLY-- IT JUST STRUCK ME HOW MUCH LEADERS MATTER IN HISTORY.

I MEAN, THERE ARE HISTORICAL FORCES AND PATTERNS, BUT GORBACHEV, BECAUSE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SYSTEM WAS UNSUSTAINABLE WAS QUITE SINCERE IN TRYING TO NOT ONLY REFORM THE SYSTEM, WHICH PROVED TO BE A CHALLENGE THAT WAS BEYOND HIS CAPACITY AND BEYOND THE COUNTRY'S CAPACITY.

BUT HE ALSO WANTED TO BECOME PART OF THE WEST.

HE REALLY KIND OF SINCERELY ADOPTED WESTERN VALUES.

HE TALKED ABOUT A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE.

AND I THINK THE WEST TRIED TO RECIPROCATE.

EISENHOWER: IS THERE A POSSIBILITY FOR ALLIANCE?

THERE'S ALWAYS BEEN A STRANGE ALLIANCE OF SOME KIND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

THAT'S THE INTERESTING THING ABOUT IT.

WE'VE NEVER REALLY HAD-- WE'VE HAD COLLATERAL CONFLICTS, BUT WE HAVEN'T REALLY CONFLICTED.

WE'VE NEVER FOUGHT WARS AGAINST EACH OTHER.

IS AN ALLIANCE POSSIBLE?

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HAVE NEVER, EVER BEEN GOOD FOR A SUSTAINED PERIOD OF TIME SINCE THE U.S.

BECAME A SIGNIFICANT POWER IN THE WORLD, AROUND 1900.

THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL CLASH OF INTERESTS.

IT'S NOT A MISUNDERSTANDING... EISENHOWER: BUT VALUES IS WHAT YOU'RE SAYING.

IT'S VALUES.

IT'S EVEN DEEPER... FIRST OF ALL, THE AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IS AT ITS BASE: PREVENT ANOTHER COUNTRY FROM DOMINATING ITS REGION.

PREVENT ANY MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY DOMINATING THE MIDDLE EAST, PREVENT RUSSIA DOMINATING EURASIA, PREVENT CHINA OR ANYBODY ELSE DOMINATING EAST ASIA, RIGHT?

RUSSIA'S GRAND STRATEGY IS DOMINATE THEIR REGION.

SO THERE'S THIS FUNDAMENTAL CLASH OF INTERESTS.

YOU CAN'T TALK MORE AND HAVE BETTER DIALOGUE TO OVERCOME THE FUNDA-- YOU CAN MANAGE A FUNDAMENTAL CLASH OF INTERESTS.

THE HIGHEST VALUE IN AMERICAN CULTURE IS FREEDOM, FREEDOM FROM THE STATE, AND THE HIGHEST VALUE IN RUSSIAN CULTURE IS THE STATE.

SO IF THERE'S A FUNDAMENTAL CLASH OF INTERESTS AND VALUES, THERE'S A LIMIT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF HOW FAR IT CAN GO.

IT CAN BE MANAGED BETTER.

IT'S MANAGED VERY POORLY RIGHT NOW FROM BOTH SIDES IN MY POINT OF VIEW, BUT THE IDEA THAT WE'RE GOING TO GET AN ALLIANCE-- DAVID, EVEN THE WORLD WAR II ALLIANCE FELL WELL SHORT OF AN ALLIANCE, AS YOU KNOW.

IT SURE DID.

OF COURSE IT DID.

BUT, AGAIN, I THINK THAT IT'S REMARKABLE THAT IN ASSESSING THE FUTURE AND SO FORTH, THE FIRST CONCEPT THAT COMES UP IS THE DEGREE OF THEIR WESTERNIZATION.

WE HAVE BEEN SPEAKING ON THE PREMISE THAT RUSSIA'S GOING TO BE A STATE-ORIENTED NATION, IT'S GOING TO BE A PERSONAL RULE ORIENTATION THAT IS GOING TO ESSENTIALLY STAND AS A POWER BASED ON MILITARY THROW-WEIGHT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SO FORTH.

THIS ALL ASSUMES THAT THEIR ECONOMY IS GOING TO REMAIN SMALL.

IS THERE ANY PROSPECT THAT RUSSIA WILL BECOME A MODERN RAPID-GROWTH ECONOMY?

POLYAKOVA: ALL PROJECTIONS FOR RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH ARE STAGNATION.

YOU KNOW, 1.5%, SOMETHING LIKE THIS OVER THE MEDIUM AND LONG TERM.

AND YOU ASKED THE QUESTION EARLIER OF HOW IS RUSSIA DIFFERENT, HOW IS IT THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS REGIME, THE SOVIET UNION?

IT IS THE SAME IN THE SENSE THAT ITS ECONOMY IS STILL HYDROCARBON-DEPENDENT.

SO OIL AND GAS EXPORTS.

SO IF YOU LOOK AT HOW RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS DOING-- STANDARD OF LIVING, ALL THESE KINDS OF METRICS-- THEY TRACK COMPLETELY WITH THE OIL PRICE.

SO THAT IS BASICALLY WHAT DETERMINES HOW WELL THE RUSSIANS LIVE AND HOW MUCH POWER THE REGIME HAS.

WHEN DID IT BECOME THAT ECONOMY?

WELL, I CAN'T--I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT YEAR WHEN THEY BECAME A MORE DEPENDENT POWER.

MAYBE STEVE REMEMBERS THE EXACT YEAR.

SO THE SOVIET UNION WAS NEVER MORE THAN 1% OF WORLD TRADE, AND ALL OF IT WAS HYDROCARBONS.

BECAUSE TRADE WITHIN THE SOVIET BLOC WAS NOT REALLY CONSIDERED WORLD TRADE.

EISENHOWER: I GET IT.

BUT THERE'S A DEEPER ISSUE HERE, A DEEPER ISSUE ABOUT WHERE THIS IS GOING.

OF COURSE, WE FOCUS ON THE PERSONALITIES OF STALIN, GORBACHEV, YELTSIN, AND NOW PUTIN.

BUT, ONCE AGAIN, THERE'S A LARGER PROBLEM HERE, WHICH IS RUSSIAN POWER IN THE WORLD.

HOW WOULD YOU MANAGE RUSSIAN POWER IN THE WORLD IF YOU WERE IN CHARGE, RIGHT?

THEY'VE HAD SEVERAL INSTANCES OF STATE COLLAPSE.

THE STATE COLLAPSE, THE CZARS' PERIOD, THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE DISSOLVED JUST LIKE THE SOVIET UNION.

THE STATE COLLAPSE IS NOT AN OUTCOME THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE WANT TO SEE.

AND SO THE IDEA OF STABILITY HAS DEEP ROOTS IN THE POPULATION.

YOU HAVE, HOWEVER, STAGNATION WITH THE STABILITY.

AND THIS IS WHERE THEY GET STUCK IN THE STATIST SYSTEM.

THEY GET STUCK NOT BECAUSE PREDOMINANTLY PUTIN IS AN EVIL GUY OR READ THE WRONG ECONOMICS TEXTBOOK OR WAS IN EAST GERMANY DURING GORBACHEV'S ERA OF FREEDOM.

IT'S BECAUSE YOU'VE GOT A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION-- THE GEOGRAPHY IS COMPLICATED, THE CHINA STORY.

RUSSIA'S MAIN PROBLEM IN THE WORLD TODAY IS CHINA, IRONICALLY, THAT THEY'RE IN THIS ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP WITH.

CHINA IS EATING THEIR LUNCH ACROSS EURASIA, AND SO THEY HAVE NO ANSWER FOR THAT EITHER.

AND SO THE FAILURE TO DIVERSIFY THE ECONOMY, THE FAILURE TO ALLOW SMALL AND MEDIUM BUSINESSES TO GIVE SOME DYNAMISM.

THEIR MIDDLE CLASS LIVES IN LONDON, PARIS, NEW YORK.

POLYAKOVA: UPPER CLASS.

HA HA!

THEY'RE IN THE LABORATORIES AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

THEY'VE HEMORRHAGED MASSIVE HUMAN CAPITAL, WHICH SHOULD BE THEIR FUTURE.

LOOK WHERE WE ARE.

LOOK WHO'S SITTING NEXT TO ME.

LOOK HOW ARTICULATE AND SMART ALINA IS.

AND SHE'S LOST TO THAT COUNTRY RIGHT NOW, AND THAT'S A BIG STORY ACROSS THE WORLD...

BUT WITH A MEMORY OF GREATNESS, A SENSE OF UNIQUENESS... KOTKIN: THEY STILL HAVE THAT.

WHICH MEANS THAT THEY ARE STILL A FACTOR, AND SO THEY ARE STILL A PROBLEM FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

NOW, WE'VE HAD DOCTRINES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THAT PROBLEM.

ONE IS CONTAINMENT.

THAT IS A GEOPOLITICAL DOCTRINE.

WE'VE HAD STRATEGIC DOCTRINES, SUCH AS DETERRENCE.

LOOKING FORWARD-- AND I'D LIKE TO POSE THIS IN CONCLUSION TO OUR PANEL-- IS THERE A PHRASE THAT COMES TO MIND, A LABEL FOR AN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE FUTURE, SAY, IN THE NEXT DECADE OR SO?

YOU KNOW, CONTAINMENT WORKED.

AND SO IT'S VERY TEMPTING TO GO BACK TO CONTAINMENT, WHICH IS TO SAY, HOLD THE LINE AGAINST THAT SYSTEM; APPLY PRESSURE FROM THE OUTSIDE; AND WATCH IT UNRAVEL INTERNALLY OVER TIME.

THE PROBLEM WITH SUCH A POLICY NOW IS THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS THAT YOU ALLUDED TO.

THE MORE ATTENTION WE PAY TO RUSSIA, THE LESS ATTENTION WE HAVE, THE LESS BANDWIDTH WE HAVE FOR DEALING WITH CHINA AND EAST ASIA AND MANY OTHER SIGNIFICANT THINGS-- INVESTING IN SCIENCE AT HOME; BEING THE LEADER IN BIOENGINEERING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND GETTING OUR ACT TOGETHER BACK HOME WHILE ALSO UNDERSTANDING WHAT OUR POLICY SHOULD BE IN ASIA.

RUSSIA COULD POTENTIALLY COME AT THE EXPENSE OF THAT.

IT'S ALREADY STEALING TOO MUCH OF OUR NATIONAL ATTENTION THESE DAYS.

EISENHOWER: ALINA, WOULD YOU CONCUR WITH THAT?

ARE WE PAYING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THIS?

AND WHAT WOULD BE THE ALTERNATIVE TO CONTAINMENT, SOME SORT OF MIX BETWEEN CONTAINMENT AND INTEGRATION INTO A SORT OF A WIDER...?

WELL, WE'VE TRIED THAT IN THE NINETIES, BASICALLY.

BY "WE," I MEAN THE WEST.

HAS TRIED TO GIVE RUSSIA A PATH TOWARDS INTEGRATION IN THE WIDER ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY.

THE U.S. WAS VERY MUCH ON THE SIDE OF HAVING RUSSIA JOIN THE WTO, WHICH WAS SOMETHING THAT RUSSIAN LEADERS VERY MUCH WANTED.

AND PUTIN HAS TALKED ABOUT THAT HIMSELF.

YOU KNOW, TO GO BACK TO STEVE'S POINT THAT CONTAINMENT WORKED AND IT'S TEMPTING TO GO BACK TO THAT, WE ARE IN A DIFFERENT TIME PERIOD AND WITH VERY DIFFERENT INTERESTS AND--TYPES OF POLITICAL POWER, YET RUSSIA HAS VERY MUCH BECOME A MAJOR SPOILER FOR U.S.

INTERESTS ACROSS THE WORLD.

AND IT WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THAT ROLE.

THAT'S BASICALLY THE ONLY ROLE IT CAN PLAY GIVEN ITS VERY LIMITED CAPACITY.

SPOILER IS WHAT YOU'RE SAYING.

EXACTLY.

BUT THAT DOESN'T CHANGE THE FACT THAT IT CAN CAUSE A GREAT DEAL OF DAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES.

AND WE'VE, OF COURSE, SEEN THIS IN OUR OWN ELECTIONS NOW, RIGHT?

SO SOME SORT OF DETERRENCE POLICY VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON, I THINK, OVER MULTIPLE ADMINISTRATIONS, SHOULD CONTINUE TO INVEST IN IT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME UNDERSTANDING THAT RUSSIA WILL CONTINUE TO COMPETE, AND NOW IT'S OUT-COMPETING THE UNITED STATES IN THIS NON-CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRIC SPACE.

THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGE HERE IS SOMETHING THAT BRINGS NATO TO MIND, WHICH IS AN ORGANIZATION TO PREVENT DAMAGE.

THIS WAS ALSO THE FOUNDATION OF THE CONTAINMENT POLICY FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE, MR.

AMBASSADOR.

YEAH, WELL, I THINK NATO HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN KEEPING THE WEST TOGETHER AND MAINTAINING DETERRENCE, FIRST OF ALL DETERRENCE AGAINST DIRECT AGGRESSION, WHICH MAY BE UNLIKELY BUT CAN'T BE COMPLETELY RULED OUT, BUT ALSO CHECKING RUSSIAN AMBITIONS BY SUPPORTING COUNTRIES LIKE UKRAINE AND GEORGIA SO THAT THEY CAN STAND UP FOR THEMSELVES, RECOGNIZING THAT OVER TIME, RUSSIA IS A DECLINING POWER AND CAN'T COMPETE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF SOME OF THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WITH A STAGNANT ECONOMY, LACK OF INNOVATION, BRAIN DRAIN, ALL THE THINGS THAT MY COLLEAGUES HAVE JUST TALKED ABOUT.

BUT I DO THINK WE DO HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT RUSSIA AS A SPOILER.

I WROTE THAT WORD DOWN BEFORE THE OTHERS USED IT.

[EISENHOWER CHUCKLES] BUT THERE IT'S KIND OF A QUESTION OF, YOU KNOW, DEPRIVING THEM OF THE OPPORTUNITIES.

I MEAN, WE'RE CEDING THE FIELD TO THE RUSSIANS TO SOME DEGREE IN SYRIA RIGHT NOW.

MAYBE LIBYA AS WELL.

WE NEED MUCH MORE AGILE DIPLOMACY, APPLY FORCE JUDICIOUSLY TO COUNTER SOME OF THE RUSSIANS' GAMBITS BUT AT THE SAME TIME, CONTINUE TO REACH OUT TO THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF RUSSIA.

I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD GIVE UP ON THOSE FEW WESTERNIZERS WHO MAY STILL BE LEFT.

AND 1991.

IT'S ACTUALLY BEEN A PASSAGE OF A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME.

KOTKIN: YES.

WE ARE STILL HAVING WONDERFUL DISCUSSIONS, SUCH AS THE ONE WE'VE HAD TODAY, ABOUT THE POST-COLD WAR RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA.

WE ARE TRULY GRATEFUL TO ALL OF YOU FOR BEING HERE TODAY.

AND THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THIS DISCUSSION.

THANK YOU.

THANK YOU.

FOR CENTURIES IN THE WIDER WEST AND FOR MANY DECADES IN THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA HAS BEEN VIEWED AS WHAT THE REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF THE 1980s SUMMARIZED AS A "BEAR IN THE WOODS."

WHEN THE SOVIET UNION DISSOLVED IN 1991, MANY SERIOUS AND STEADY PEOPLE SPOKE OF THE END OF HISTORY, THE END OF GREAT POWER POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, AND WITH THAT, VERY LIKELY, THE END OF THE THREAT OF MAJOR WAR IN THE WORLD.

ALL OF THIS WAS TO BE ANCHORED BY EUROPE-- WHOLE, FREE, AND AT PEACE, WITH THE DEFINITION OF EUROPE THEN THOUGHT TO BE ABLE, FINALLY, TO INCLUDE RUSSIA.

IN THE 1990s, AS COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS AND AT LEAST A FORM OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY TOOK OVER RUSSIA, IT SEEMED AS IF THE BEAR HAD FINALLY BEEN TAMED.

OF COURSE, THIS LASTED BUT A FEW YEARS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE STRONG-WILLED FORMER KGB AGENT VLADIMIR PUTIN AS RUSSIA'S LEADER, WITH HIS DECLARATION THAT THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE GREATEST TRAGEDY IN THE HISTORY OF THE 20th CENTURY, RAISING CONCERNS IN MANY QUARTERS ABOUT A RETURN TO COLD WAR AND THE THREAT OF ACTUAL WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST.

SO HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TODAY'S RUSSIA?

DO OLD DOCTRINES OF CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE STILL HAVE RELEVANCE, OR ARE THERE POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW FORMS OF COLLABORATION AROUND BOTH NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY?

I'M DAVID EISENHOWER, AND THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR WATCHING "THE WHOLE TRUTH."

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THE MILL SPRING FOUNDATION, THE DORAN FAMILY FOUNDATION, AMETEK, AND BY... AND BY CONTRIBUTIONS TO YOUR PBS STATION FROM VIEWERS LIKE YOU.

THANK YOU.